Understanding how contextual stances progress through social reinforcement toward harmful patterns
Contemporary discourse operates in an age of labels. "Narcissist." "Misogynist." "Misandrist." These words appear frequently in social media feeds, news articles, and everyday conversations. They function as explanations for behaviour deemed troubling, as moral judgments about people one disagrees with, and increasingly as weapons deployed to end discussions rather than further them.
But what if these terms have been misunderstood? What if, rather than identifying fixed pathologies in defective individuals, they point toward positions most people occupy at different times, in different contexts, for different reasons? What if the very act of labelling someone with these terms reveals more about the labeller's position than the target's?
This essay argues for a fundamental revaluation: these aren't diagnostic categories for other people. They're descriptions of relational stances that emerge in specific contexts, serve particular functions, and shift as circumstances change. Most people move through narcissistic positions, contemptuous positions, defensive positions. The question isn't whether one occupies these stances, but when, why, and with what consequences.
Understanding this doesn't make harmful behaviour acceptable. But it does something more useful than moral condemnation: it reveals the mechanisms by which positions harden into patterns, the social forces that accelerate this progression, and the points at which intervention might interrupt it—in individuals and collectives.
Before examining how these terms function in contemporary discourse, it's worth understanding what they originally meant—and how that meaning has shifted.
Narcissist derives from the Greek myth of Narcissus, a young man who fell in love with his own reflection and wasted away staring at it. The term entered psychological vocabulary through Havelock Ellis (1898) and later Freud, eventually becoming formalised as Narcissistic Personality Disorder in the DSM-III (1980). In Greek, narkissos relates to numbness or torpor—suggesting not just self-love but a kind of emotional paralysis, an inability to move beyond one's own reflection toward genuine engagement with others.
The clinical definition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2022) centres on pervasive patterns of grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy. Recent network analysis identifies "need for admiration" as the most central feature, functioning as a bridge between other narcissistic traits (Gori & Topino, 2025, "A network analysis of pathological narcissism"). But in everyday usage, "narcissist" has become shorthand for anyone who prioritises their own needs, seeks recognition, or appears insufficiently attentive to others' feelings—a dramatic expansion from the clinical criteria.
Misogyny comes from Greek misos (hatred) and gynē (woman). Classical texts reveal that even in ancient Greece, where women's subordination was systematic and explicit, misogyny specifically denoted not the structural arrangements themselves but an excessive hatred beyond cultural norms. Holland (2006, Misogyny: The World's Oldest Prejudice) demonstrates that accusations of misogyny served as boundary-markers—identifying men whose contempt for women exceeded what their society deemed acceptable.
Feminist scholarship has significantly refined understanding of misogyny. Manne (2017, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny) distinguishes between misogyny as an affective practice—the enforcement mechanism that punishes women who violate patriarchal expectations—and sexism as the ideology that justifies it. McCarthy and Taylor (2024, "When the exception proves the rule") show how gendered organisational practices systematically undermine women's authority whilst appearing neutral. Wrisley (2023, "Feminist standpoint theory and misogyny") examines how misogyny operates through discourse that normalises violence against women. García-Jiménez et al. (2024, "Online misogyny: A systematic review"), in a systematic review of digital misogyny research, identify four key patterns: objectification, derision, violence, and discrediting—with significant overlap between online and offline manifestations.
Misandry—hatred of men—entered English vocabulary much later, primarily as a theoretical counterpart to misogyny. Its usage reveals something interesting: while misogyny describes a well-documented system of enforcement and violence against women, misandry appears predominantly in defensive contexts, often deployed to suggest equivalent harm or to deflect attention from discussions of misogyny itself.
Yet the asymmetry in usage doesn't negate the possibility of genuine contempt toward men as a category. Women who've experienced male violence, women exhausted by male entitlement, women navigating environments where masculine dominance is unchallenged—they may indeed develop generalised contempt. The question isn't whether such contempt exists, but how it functions, what structures it operates within, and what consequences it produces.
Transactional Analysis, developed by Eric Berne (1961/2016, Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy), offers a precise framework for understanding how these positions operate in real-time interactions. Rather than seeing personality as fixed, TA identifies three ego states that most people move between:
Parent: The internalised voices of authority—rules, judgments, prescriptions about how things "should" be. When individuals occupy Parent, they replay scripts learned from actual parents and other authority figures. This state can be Nurturing (caring, protective) or Critical (judging, condemning).
Adult: The state of present-moment assessment, where individuals process information about the current situation without the overlay of past conditioning or overwhelming emotion. Adult isn't "mature"—it's simply oriented toward what's actually happening right now rather than what should happen or what one might fear will happen.
Child: The seat of emotion, spontaneity, creativity—but also of learned responses to authority. When individuals occupy Child, they replay adaptive strategies developed early in life. This state can be Free (spontaneous, authentic) or Adapted (compliant or rebellious in response to perceived authority).
Here is what matters for understanding narcissist/misogynist/misandrist labels: these represent ego states, not personality types.
When someone appears "narcissistic," they're likely in Child state—specifically, the part of Child that learned early on that attention and admiration were scarce resources requiring constant strategic effort to secure. When someone appears "misogynistic" or "misandrist," they may be in Critical Parent—replaying judgmental scripts about what men or women are like, should be like, deserve.
TA reveals that most people cycle through these states frequently, often in response to what state the other person occupies. A man in Critical Parent (judging women) invites Child responses (defensive rebellion or anxious compliance). A woman in Adapted Child (complying with male authority) invites Parent responses (judgment or protection). These patterns lock in through repeated interaction, creating what Berne called "games"—predictable sequences where each party typically plays their assigned role.
The labels narcissist/misogynist/misandrist typically emerge when someone is stuck in one ego state across multiple contexts. But TA suggests this stuckness isn't a personality defect—it's a response to relational dynamics that keep activating the same state. Young (2025, "When Helping Hurts") demonstrates how systemic change fails precisely because it tries to fix stuck states through Parent interventions (telling people what they should do differently) rather than inviting Adult engagement with actual circumstances.
The distinction between shame and guilt offers another crucial lens for understanding how these labels function—and why they're so destructive to dialogue (Young, 2025, "When Helping Hurts"). Research on moral emotions provides robust empirical support for this distinction. Tangney and Dearing (2002, Shame and Guilt) demonstrate that shame involves global negative evaluation of the self, whilst guilt focuses on specific behaviours, with significantly different psychological outcomes. Brown (2006, "Shame resilience theory") found that shame correlates with depression, addiction, and aggression, whilst guilt correlates with adaptive behaviour and empathy.
Guilt attaches to specific behaviours: "You behaved narcissistically in that meeting when you talked over most people." This is correctable. Behaviour can change. Guilt invites reflection, repair, adjustment.
Shame attaches to identity: "One ARE a narcissist." This isn't correctable—it defines the person's fundamental nature. Shame invites defensiveness, denial, counter-attack. As Young (2025, "When Helping Hurts") explains: "Shame says there's something wrong with WHO one is. Guilt says there's something wrong with WHAT one did."
When labelling someone a narcissist, misogynist, or misandrist, one typically makes a shame-based identity claim, not a guilt-based behavioural observation. The implicit message becomes: this person IS defective, not this person DID something problematic. The distinction matters enormously:
Identity framing: "He's a misogynist" → Invites defensiveness, ends conversation, forecloses change
Behavioural framing: "He's behaving contemptuously toward women in this context" → Invites examination, maintains conversation, allows for shift
The identity framing appears in Critical Parent ego state—judging the person's fundamental nature. The behavioural framing appears in Adult—assessing what's actually happening without diagnosing permanent defect.
Here is the uncomfortable recognition: when deploying these labels, one often attempts to shame the other person into changing. But shame doesn't produce growth—it produces defence. As Young (2025, "When Helping Hurts") notes, people in shame states either collapse (accepting the identity as true and immutable) or attack (defending against the shame by projecting it back). Neither response involves genuine examination or change.
The alternative isn't to avoid naming problematic patterns. It's to name them as positions currently occupied rather than identities permanently fixed. "One is occupying a narcissistic position right now" leaves room for movement. "One is a narcissist" closes the door.
Understanding these as positions rather than pathologies is often crucial—but incomplete. Positions aren't static. They can calcify into patterns through repeated activation and social reinforcement. What begins as contextual response can harden into habitual stance, and eventually into something that begins to resemble what might be called pathology.
The progression follows identifiable stages:
"I'm prioritising my needs right now"—appropriate self-focus in a specific context. This tends to be adaptive, necessary, healthy. Setting boundaries, attending to one's own requirements, declining requests that would overwhelm—all legitimate exercises of self-care.
"I'm prioritising my needs most of the time"—the position becomes default stance rather than contextual response. What was adaptive in one situation generalises across contexts. The person begins preferring their needs not just when necessary but as standard operating procedure.
Others validate the position. This is the critical stage—where private stance becomes socially rehearsed pattern. Consider the pub banter about "women drivers" mentioned earlier. A group of men reinforcing contemptuous scripts about women's competence—is this harmful?
Historical Context: The Pub as Cultural Institution
Before examining that question, it's worth understanding the pub itself as a cultural institution with deep historical significance. The very names—The Queen's Head, The King's Head, The Red Lion—operated as coded signals about what could be spoken within. The Queen's Head might refer to Anne Boleyn or Catherine Howard—Henry VIII's beheaded wives who "played" the King and showed contempt for common folk in the popular imagination. The King's Head might invoke Charles I—beheaded after civil war. These names signalled which political positioning the establishment welcomed: royalist or anti-royalist, reformist or traditionalist, loyal or contemptuous toward authority.
This wasn't merely historical trivia. The pub name functioned as coded announcement: "This is where people like us gather. This is where certain things can be said that cannot be said elsewhere. If one understands the code, one is welcome. If one doesn't, one might not be."
The pub tradition created bounded spaces where people could speak what couldn't be spoken at work, at home, in church, or in the street. These were "safe spaces" in the original sense—not safe from offence, but safe from the consequences that would follow if such speech occurred in formal settings. The same contemptuous statement about authority made in the pub carried different weight than if made in the town square, not because the words changed, but because the bounded space signalled: "this is performance, this is testing, this is where we explore positions we might not actually hold."
This served several functions simultaneously: releasing pressure from maintaining propriety, allowing challenge to authority through mockery that couldn't be expressed directly, creating in-group bonding through shared transgression, and providing testing ground for ideas too risky to voice elsewhere.
But here's the crucial contemporary complication: that tradition—though rarer—still carries some social legacy. Some people understand pub banter as operating within this historically coded safe space for risqué speech and behaviour. Others, unaware of or rejecting this tradition, encounter the same banter as simply offensive speech that should face consequences regardless of location. This creates genuine friction between those who hold the tradition ("it's just pub talk, it doesn't count") and those who don't recognise any bounded space where contemptuous positioning becomes acceptable through context alone.
The friction isn't just cultural misunderstanding—it's a fundamental disagreement about whether location-based permission for contemptuous positioning should exist at all. Those defending pub banter tradition aren't necessarily defending the content of the contempt; they're defending the bounded space where positioning can be performed without immediately triggering professional consequences or moral judgment. Those challenging the tradition aren't necessarily humourless or censorious; they're questioning whether any space should grant immunity from accountability for contemptuous speech.
This matters profoundly for understanding Step 3 because it means the same interaction might simultaneously be:
The pub isn't just a location—it's a contested cultural container whose very legitimacy is now disputed. What happens in the pub has historically been understood as partly performative, partly playful, partly serious, and deliberately ambiguous about which is which. But that historical understanding no longer holds universally, creating situations where people operate by incompatible rules whilst believing they're in the same social game.
Now, to the question: is pub banter harmful?
Here's where it becomes genuinely complicated. The same words, the same laughter, can serve radically different functions:
The Jester Function: When Contempt Serves Context
The Jester Function Within the Group: The comment about "women drivers" or "mansplaining" might be ironic—a playful acknowledgement of stereotype's absurdity, delivered with exaggeration that signals "we don't actually believe this." The group's laughter recognises the irony, the shared understanding that the speaker is performing contempt rather than occupying it. This is the jester function operating at pub level: someone saying the unspeakable thing precisely to puncture its power through mockery. The contempt targets the stereotype itself, not the people it describes.
The Reinforcement Function: The identical comment, delivered without irony, activates group validation of genuine contempt. The laughter now signals agreement, permission, shared positioning. The contempt targets the people, not the stereotype. What looks identical externally operates completely differently internally—and moves the speaker down the progression pathway.
The distinction matters profoundly, but it's often impossible for outsiders to determine which function is operating. Even group members may not consciously recognise the difference. The same person might deliver the same line ironically on Monday (jester function, bounded contempt, no progression risk) and sincerely on Friday (reinforcement function, calcifying contempt, accelerating progression).
Several factors distinguish jester-function banter from progression-accelerating banter:
Playful Exaggeration: Jester banter typically amplifies the stereotype to absurdity—making its ridiculousness visible through performance. "Of course women can't drive, that's why they only cause 30% of accidents whilst doing 40% of the mileage—clearly incompetent!" The exaggeration itself signals irony. Progression banter states the stereotype as simple fact: "Women drivers, what can one say?"
Shifting Targets: Jester banter rotates contempt—today mocking male patterns, tomorrow female patterns, consistently targeting the absurdity of stereotyping itself rather than reinforcing hierarchy. Progression banter consistently targets the same group, building a stable pattern of contempt.
Self-Inclusion: Jester banter often includes the speaker's own group in the mockery: "Men explaining things women already know—tale as old as time, and I've definitely done it." This signals the speaker occupies a meta-position, observing the pattern rather than defending their position within it. Progression banter excludes the speaker's group from critique.
Reception Dynamics: Jester banter invites everyone to laugh at human absurdity. Progression banter invites the in-group to laugh at the out-group. If someone from the targeted group were present, would the comment still be funny, or would it become hostile? That test frequently reveals the function.
Boundary Maintenance: Jester banter, when challenged, shifts immediately—"I was obviously joking, I don't actually think that." Progression banter, when challenged, doubles down—"It's just a joke, why are you so sensitive?" The difference reveals whether the positioning is temporary/performative or calcifying/defended.
But—and this is crucial—even jester-function banter at Step 3 carries progression risk. Repeated ironic contempt can normalise the positioning, making it easier to occupy sincerely. The group member who starts with playful mockery of stereotypes may find themselves gradually occupying the contemptuous position more seriously, more frequently, less playfully. The boundary between performance and belief erodes through repetition.
This is why the pub banter matters profoundly, even when it starts as jester-function irony:
The parallel women's group mocking "mansplaining" operates identically. The comment might be ironic jester-function banter—mockery of male explanatory patterns that everyone recognises as absurd, including the women making the joke. Or it might be sincere reinforcement of contemptuous positioning toward men. Or, most commonly, it might be both simultaneously for different group members—some experiencing it as playful truth-telling, others experiencing it as validation of genuine contempt.
Neither involves immediate harm to anyone present. Both potentially grease the progression pathway from position to pattern—even when operating as jester function, because the repetition itself creates risk of drift from ironic performance to sincere positioning.
Repeated self-focus or contemptuous positioning reduces capacity to notice others' needs and experiences. This isn't conscious choice—it's habitual narrowing of attention. The narcissistic position, rehearsed long enough, actually diminishes empathic capacity through disuse. The contemptuous position, socially validated, makes others' perspectives less salient, less interesting, less relevant.
This empathic attenuation process has been extensively documented. Bandura (1999, "Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities"; 2002, "Selective moral disengagement") describes "moral disengagement"—psychological mechanisms enabling people to behave harmfully whilst maintaining positive self-regard. These include dehumanising language, diffusion of responsibility, and moral justification. Haslam (2006, "Dehumanization: An integrative review") demonstrates how dehumanisation follows predictable patterns, reducing targets to objects or animals lacking full human status.
The stance acquires explicit justification and becomes integrated into identity. "Of course I prioritise myself—most people should." "Men/women really ARE like that—I'm just being realistic." The position transforms from "what one is doing" into "who one is" and "how things actually are." This rationalisation makes the stance feel virtuous rather than questionable. Bandura's (2002, "Selective moral disengagement") research shows how moral disengagement allows people to maintain positive self-concepts whilst engaging in harmful behaviour—the position becomes not just acceptable but morally necessary.
Others become resources to be used rather than people to engage with reciprocally. The narcissistic position progresses to viewing others primarily for what they can provide. The contemptuous position progresses to treating the despised group as means rather than ends. Reciprocity disappears—not through malice but through genuinely not registering the obligation.
The person becomes aware that their behaviour causes damage but feels no emotional concern about it. "If they can't keep up, that's their problem." "They should be tougher." This isn't active cruelty—it's absence of conscience about impact. The capacity for guilt (behaviour-focused correction) diminishes. What remains is shame-based defence against criticism.
Deliberately using others, causing harm without conscience, sometimes taking satisfaction in the dominance. This is what one recognises as genuinely narcissistic or contemptuous behaviour—but it didn't appear fully formed. It emerged through progression from legitimate starting point.
Before examining when these progressions become harmful, it's useful to review the pathway that's been outlined:
Step 1: Internal Position (Legitimate Self-Care) - Appropriate self-focus in specific context; necessary boundaries and self-prioritisation
Step 2: Habituation (Self-Preference) - Position becomes default stance rather than contextual response; generalisation across contexts
Step 3: Social Reinforcement (Self-Absorption) - Others validate the position; pub banter, group dynamics, stroke economy rewards; critical acceleration stage
Step 4: Empathic Attenuation (Reduced Noticing) - Habitual narrowing of attention; diminished capacity to notice others' needs through disuse
Step 5: Rationalisation (Moral Justification) - Stance acquires explicit justification; integrated into identity; feels virtuous rather than questionable
Step 6: Instrumentalisation (Self-Service) - Others become resources rather than people; reciprocity disappears without malice
Step 7: Indifference to Harm (Awareness Without Concern) - Conscious awareness of damage caused but no emotional concern; absence of conscience about impact
Step 8: Active Exploitation (Self-Supremacy) - Deliberate use of others; harm without conscience; sometimes satisfaction in dominance
The progression operates identically whether the starting position is narcissistic (self-focus), misogynistic (contempt toward women), or misandrist (contempt toward men). What begins as contextually appropriate positioning can calcify through social reinforcement, habitual rehearsal, and stroke economy pressures into patterns that progress toward genuine exploitation.
Framework Applicability Beyond This Essay: This eight-step progression describes a general mechanism that operates across most pathologised labels used in contemporary discourse. Racist, ageist, ableist, homophobic, transphobic, xenophobic—these labels typically describe Step 6-8 positioning, but the progression pathway remains identical: legitimate starting position (contextual frustration or boundary-setting) → habituation → social reinforcement → empathic attenuation → rationalisation → instrumentalisation → indifference → exploitation. The framework applies wherever contemptuous positioning toward a category of people can progress from temporary stance to entrenched pattern. This essay focuses on narcissist/misogynist/misandrist as exemplars, but the analytical approach transfers to understanding how any such positioning calcifies through identifiable mechanisms.
Before examining when these progressions become harmful, there's a crucial exception to consider: the social function of satire, parody, and comedic contempt as mirrors for power. This tradition stretches from medieval court jesters to contemporary comedians, and understanding it reveals something important about the difference between contemptuous positioning that corrodes and contemptuous positioning that clarifies.
The court jester occupied a unique structural position in medieval society. Whilst everyone else operated within rigid hierarchies where challenging the monarch meant death, the jester held explicit permission to mock, parody, and speak uncomfortable truths—precisely because these truths came wrapped in humour and performance. The fool's costume, the playful delivery, the exaggerated mimicry—these weren't just entertainment. They were the social technology that allowed criticism to bypass defensive responses.
The jester could occupy Step 3 (social reinforcement of contemptuous scripts) and even Step 4 (reduced empathy toward the target) without progressing toward Step 6-8 because the positioning served a specific social function: holding up a mirror to power when no one else could. The mockery wasn't meant to destroy the monarch—it was meant to remind the monarch of their humanity, their fallibility, their position within rather than above the social order.
This worked through several mechanisms:
Fast-forward to contemporary society, and comedians increasingly occupy this jester function—but without the institutional recognition or protection that medieval jesters enjoyed. Russell Brand, Ricky Gervais, Konstantin Kisin, and numerous others operate in this space: using humour, parody, and yes, contempt, to speak what conventional discourse suppresses.
Consider Brand's trajectory from entertainment comedian to YouTube commentator addressing institutional corruption, pharmaceutical industry influence, political manipulation. Or Gervais's performances hosting the Golden Globes, where he mocked wealthy celebrities' hypocrisy, virtue signalling, and disconnect from ordinary people—directly to their faces whilst millions watched at home. Or Graham Linehan (creator of Father Ted and The IT Crowd), who faced professional destruction for campaigning regarding women's safe spaces and challenging trans activism orthodoxies. Or Konstantin Kisin, whose intellectual analysis was rooted in social commentary—examining identity politics, environmental alarmism, and ideological capture—but who utilised this analysis to develop comedy routines for the circuit, simultaneously building media profile and income whilst performing the jester function through accessible entertainment.
These comedians occupy contemptuous positions (Step 3-4) toward powerful actors and ideological systems. They rehearse scripts that mock, diminish, and challenge. They receive social reinforcement from audiences hungry for someone to say what they're thinking but cannot voice. And importantly, they face consequences—deplatforming, demonetisation, public shaming, professional exile—that medieval jesters, with their licenced status, typically avoided.
What separates the jester's contempt from the narcissist's or misogynist's progression? Several factors:
1. Direction of Power: The jester's contempt travels upward—mocking monarchs, institutions, dominant ideologies. It challenges concentrated power rather than reinforcing existing hierarchies or punching down at vulnerable groups. When comedians mock the powerful's hypocrisy, institutional corruption, or ideological overreach, they're performing the jester function. When they mock marginalised groups for being marginalised, they've abandoned it.
2. Invitation to Reflection: The medieval jester aimed to prompt the monarch's self-examination, not their destruction. Contemporary comedic contempt at its best serves the same function—inviting the powerful to notice their absurdities, contradictions, disconnection from reality. The goal is course correction, not cancellation.
3. Explicit Performance: The jester wore the costume. The comedian stands on a stage or behind a camera with explicit framing: "this is satire, this is parody, this is comedic exaggeration." That framing creates the psychological space for uncomfortable truths to land without triggering pure defensiveness—though increasingly, audiences struggle to maintain this distinction.
4. Personal Risk: The jester risked execution if they miscalculated. Contemporary comedians risk professional destruction, public shaming, loss of income, social ostracism. This risk itself suggests the contempt isn't progressing toward exploitation (Step 6-8)—because exploitation implies power over the target, and these comedians frequently have less institutional power than those they critique.
5. Bounded Positioning: The medieval jester returned to humility after the performance. The role was temporary, contained, recognised as performance rather than identity. Contemporary comedians at their best maintain this boundary—occupying contemptuous positioning for the performance, then stepping out of it. When they remain stuck in contemptuous positioning across all contexts (Step 5-6), they've lost the jester function and become simply contemptuous.
Here's where it becomes complicated: audiences, institutions, and the powerful themselves increasingly refuse to recognise the jester function. They collapse the distinction between:
When Gervais mocks Hollywood celebrities' hypocrisy at the Golden Globes—their private jets to climate conferences, their moral lectures whilst working with Harvey Weinstein, their pretence of solidarity with ordinary people—critics label this mean-spirited rather than recognising it as the jester's mirror held up to concentrated wealth and influence. When Linehan campaigns for women's single-sex spaces, critics label him transphobic—collapsing his concern for women's safety into hatred of trans people. When Brand questions pharmaceutical industry narratives, critics label him conspiracy theorist—collapsing his jester-function contempt toward institutional corruption into contempt toward scientific consensus. When Kisin satirises apocalyptic environmental rhetoric through comedy whilst maintaining intellectual analysis of policy failures, critics label him climate denier—collapsing his examination of ideological overreach into contempt toward environmental science itself.
This diagnostic confusion serves those who benefit from not being mocked. By labelling the jester's contempt as pathology (narcissism) or bigotry (misogyny, transphobia), the powerful eliminate the one social mechanism that historically punctured their certainty without requiring revolution.
Not all comedic contempt serves the jester function. Sometimes comedians do progress down the pathway from playful mirror to exploitative positioning:
Loss of Playfulness: When mockery becomes solely angry, bitter, vindictive—when the humour disappears and only contempt remains—the jester function has been abandoned. The medieval jester who stopped making the monarch laugh and only made them angry lost their head.
Punching Down: When contempt targets those with less power, less voice, less institutional backing—it's no longer the jester's mirror. It's simply bullying dressed in humour's clothing.
Identity Fusion: When the comedian can no longer distinguish between their performance of contempt and their actual positioning—when they remain contemptuous offstage, in relationships, across contexts—they've progressed from Step 3 toward Steps 5-6.
Exploitation: When the contempt serves primarily to build the comedian's platform, wealth, or influence rather than to illuminate truth—when it becomes instrumentalised for personal gain—it's lost the jester function and become narcissistic positioning.
Societies without functioning jesters—without licenced truth-tellers who can mock power playfully—tend toward two failure modes:
Authoritarian Closure: Power becomes so concentrated and defensive that no one can challenge it without lethal consequences. The absence of the jester's playful contempt means only violent revolution can speak truth to power.
Ideological Capture: Dominant narratives become so rigid that questioning them marks one as defective, dangerous, or morally compromised. The absence of the jester's satirical distance means only true believers can speak, and doubt itself becomes heresy.
Contemporary culture exhibits both failure modes simultaneously. Some institutions and ideologies have become so defensive that even playful mockery triggers defensive elimination (deplatforming, cancellation). Other domains have become so ideologically captured that the jester function itself is reframed as violence, harm, or hate speech.
This connects directly to the pub tradition discussed at Step 3. Historically, societies needed multiple levels of bounded space for contemptuous positioning: the court jester for challenging monarchs, the pub (The Queen's Head, The King's Head) for challenging authority at community level, the private conversation for challenging received wisdom at interpersonal level. These weren't perfect institutions—they often reinforced existing hierarchies even whilst appearing to challenge them—but they provided pressure valves where contemptuous positioning could be performed, tested, and contained without immediately progressing to exploitation or triggering elimination.
When those bounded spaces collapse—when pub banter becomes subject to professional consequences, when comedians face career destruction for jester-function performances, when private conversations can be screenshotted and weaponised—the pathway from position to pattern accelerates in everyone. The powerful lose access to correction. The powerless lose access to voice. And the contemptuous positioning that might have remained at Step 3-4 (socially reinforced but bounded) progresses toward Step 6-8 (instrumentalised, exploitative, destructive) precisely because the safety valve has been eliminated.
When comedians face professional destruction for performing the jester function—for holding up playful but uncomfortable mirrors to power—the pathway from position to pattern accelerates in everyone. The powerful lose access to correction. The powerless lose access to voice. And the contemptuous positioning that might have remained at Step 3-4 (socially reinforced but bounded) progresses toward Step 6-8 (instrumentalised, exploitative, destructive) precisely because the safety valve has been eliminated.
The jester's privilege wasn't a luxury. It was a structural necessity. Societies need people who can occupy contemptuous positions toward power without immediately progressing down the pathway toward exploitation or triggering elimination. When that space collapses, everyone becomes more extreme—both the powerful and those who challenge them.
Where does it become harmful?
Not at Step 1 (legitimate self-care or contextual frustration). Arguably starting at Step 3 (social reinforcement) because that's where position begins calcifying into pattern. Definitely by Step 6 (instrumentalisation).
What accelerates progression?
What inhibits progression?
Can one occupy Step 1 without risking Step 8?
Yes, but only with active attention to the progression risk. Positions are generally human. Patterns are often concerning. Pathologies tend to be destructive. The difference lies not in whether individuals occupy these positions, but in whether they notice where they are on the pathway and what forces are pushing them further along it.
Claude Steiner (1971, "The stroke economy") identified what he termed the "stroke economy"—a system of social rules governing the exchange of recognition and validation. Building on Eric Berne's transactional analysis framework, Steiner demonstrated that strokes (units of recognition, attention, validation) are biological necessities, not psychological luxuries. Young (2025, "When Helping Hurts"; 2025, "Influence and Adaptation") develops this further: humans require social recognition as fundamentally as food or shelter.
When someone in the pub identifies the "narcissist" or "misogynist" correctly, they receive strokes: validation from the group, recognition of their moral clarity, affirmation of shared values. These rewards are neurochemically real—they feel good, they strengthen social bonds, they confirm belonging.
Conversely, challenging the group consensus—questioning whether someone really IS a narcissist or whether the contemptuous script is fair—risks stroke withdrawal. The group may withhold recognition, question the dissenter's judgment, create emotional distance. This isn't conscious manipulation; it's automatic stroke economy in action.
This is why the pub banter matters so profoundly. It's not just rehearsing contemptuous scripts—it's creating stroke economy rewards for maintaining those scripts and penalties for questioning them. Over time, the neurochemical pressure to conform, to receive strokes, to avoid isolation becomes harder to resist than intellectual doubts about the script's accuracy.
The stroke economy mechanism explains the addictive quality of social media platforms for many individuals. These platforms function as industrialised stroke delivery systems, providing immediate, quantified, and continuous recognition through likes, shares, retweets, comments, and follower counts.
For individuals who crave positive strokes—who learned early that recognition and validation were scarce resources requiring constant strategic effort—social media offers something historically unprecedented: the possibility of unlimited strokes from strangers. Each notification delivers a neurochemical reward. Each viral post provides stroke abundance that would take years to accumulate through face-to-face interaction. The appeal isn't superficiality—it's meeting a genuine biological need through newly available technological means.
But this same mechanism creates profound vulnerability. Individuals dependent on social media strokes can crumble when negative strokes arrive—criticism, ratio-ing, pile-ons, cancellation campaigns. The withdrawal isn't just psychological; it's neurochemical. Someone whose stroke economy has been sustained by continuous social media validation experiences negative strokes as genuine threat to survival, activating the same defensive responses as physical danger.
This creates several predictable patterns:
Addiction to Positive Strokes: Individuals check platforms compulsively, post strategically to maximise engagement, feel genuine anxiety when posts underperform. The behaviour mirrors substance addiction because it operates through similar neurochemical pathways. The stroke-deprived individual seeking recognition online isn't weak or narcissistic—they're responding to biological pressure for social validation through available channels.
Collapse from Negative Strokes: A critical comment that would barely register in face-to-face conversation can trigger profound distress when it appears alongside dozens of others in a social media pile-on. The accumulated negative strokes overwhelm the individual's capacity to maintain Adult ego state, triggering either Child collapse (accepting the criticism as truth about fundamental defectiveness) or Parent counter-attack (defending against shame by projecting it back onto critics).
Stroke Economy Gaming: Individuals learn to deliver strokes strategically to receive them: validating others' positioning to ensure reciprocal validation, joining pile-ons to receive group recognition, performing moral outrage to demonstrate shared values. This isn't conscious manipulation—it's adaptive response to stroke scarcity. The person who joins a cancellation campaign may genuinely believe they're holding wrongdoers accountable whilst unconsciously responding to stroke economy incentives.
Platform Dependency: Social media platforms profit from this biological mechanism. Algorithms optimise for engagement, which means optimising for stroke delivery. Posts that trigger strong emotional responses—moral outrage, righteous anger, tribal solidarity—receive algorithmic amplification because they generate more strokes for all participants. The platform becomes mediator of the stroke economy, shaping which positions receive validation and which face withdrawal.
This matters for understanding how positions calcify into patterns because social media accelerates the progression pathway:
The individual who craves positive strokes and crumbles from negative ones isn't pathologically narcissistic—they're responding to stroke economy pressures that social media has amplified to unprecedented intensity. But the mechanism still risks progression down the pathway, because the biological pressure to receive strokes and avoid stroke withdrawal can override Adult assessment of whether the positioning serves truth or simply serves stroke acquisition.
Young (2025, "Influence and Adaptation") uses the Post Office Horizon scandal to illustrate this mechanism in institutional settings. Executives couldn't admit that stroke economy silenced them—that fear of losing recognition, status, belonging prevented them from questioning obvious injustice. Instead they defaulted to "I don't recall," a phrase that protected them from conscious awareness of their complicity. The stroke economy had done its work: it made challenging the consensus literally unthinkable because the biological cost was too high.
In pub banter, the stakes seem trivial. On social media, the stakes appear global. But the mechanism is identical: social reinforcement creates biological pressure to maintain positions, accelerating the progression from stance to pattern. Those who correctly identify and condemn the "narcissist" or "misogynist" receive strokes. Those who question whether the label fits risk stroke withdrawal. Repeat this thousands of times daily rather than occasionally, and positions calcify into certainties at neurochemical speed.
With the progression framework in mind, one can now examine narcissism more precisely—not as fixed pathology but as a journey from legitimate starting point toward harmful endpoint.
Step 1-2: The Legitimate Beginning
Every infant is appropriately narcissistic—their needs ARE central, their distress SHOULD command attention. Healthy development doesn't eliminate this capacity; it contextualises it. Adults continue to need seasons of appropriate self-focus: when grieving, when ill, when depleted, when establishing necessary boundaries.
A parent prioritising their child's needs over their own isn't narcissistic—they're occupying Child position appropriately (responding to dependence). But a parent who can rarely occupy Adult position (assessing what both they and the child actually need) and insists their child exists primarily to meet parental emotional needs—they've progressed down the pathway.
Step 3-5: Social Reinforcement and Rationalisation
Contemporary culture offers peculiar stroke economy rewards for certain forms of self-focus. "Self-care" and "boundaries" and "authenticity" have become moral imperatives. The person who announces "I'm prioritising myself" receives validation—unless they do so in ways that violate other group norms.
Men who prioritise themselves through career focus receive different strokes than women who do the same—gender shapes which forms of narcissistic positioning earn recognition versus condemnation. The wealthy person prioritising their interests is "ambitious"; the poor person doing the same is "selfish." Social position determines which progressions earn reinforcement.
Step 6-8: Instrumentalisation and Exploitation
By this stage, others exist primarily as mirrors, resources, or obstacles. Relationships become transactional—what can this person provide? The capacity for genuine Adult-to-Adult engagement (mutual recognition, reciprocal care, present-moment responsiveness) has atrophied through disuse. What remains is strategic positioning: how to secure supply, maintain image, avoid accountability.
In TA terms, the person is stuck in Adapted Child ego state—specifically, the part that learned early on that love was conditional on performance, that attention was scarce, that safety required constant vigilance about how one appears to others. The narcissistic pattern isn't confidence; it's profound insecurity defended against through grandiosity.
The label "narcissist" applied at Step 1-2 is shame-based identity attack. Applied at Step 7-8, it's reasonable description of observable pattern. The difference matters: at early stages, behavioural feedback can interrupt progression. At late stages, the pattern has become so defended, so rationalised, so integrated into identity that only sustained consequences and relationship ruptures create openings for change.
Young (2025, "When Helping Hurts") notes that attempts to change narcissistic patterns through Parent interventions (telling the person what they should do differently) typically fail because they activate Child defences—the very ego state where the narcissistic adaptation originated. The person doesn't need more judgment about their defectiveness; they need safe space to examine when and why they occupy self-focused positions so persistently.
This framework—narcissism as position rather than pathology—invites an obvious question: what about people who genuinely have Narcissistic Personality Disorder? Doesn't treating narcissism as a position most people occupy sometimes risk minimising the very real harm caused by those who've reached genuinely pathological presentations?
The short answer is no—but the longer answer requires precision about what distinguishes a position from a pattern, and a pattern from a pathology.
Position describes a relational stance individuals occupy in specific contexts. One prioritises one's needs in a negotiation. One seeks validation after criticism. One focuses on one's own reflection when anxious about how others perceive one. These are normal human responses to particular circumstances. The narcissistic position isn't defective—it's functional in certain moments.
Pattern describes habitual occupation of that position across multiple contexts, often unconsciously. One consistently prioritises one's needs regardless of circumstance. One requires constant validation regardless of one's actual performance. One focuses on others' perception of one even in moments calling for attention elsewhere. The position has generalised, but it remains responsive to context—one can still shift when circumstances demand it.
Pathology describes rigid, pervasive occupation of a position regardless of context or consequence, with minimal awareness and little capacity for flexibility. One cannot prioritise others' needs even when one's relationships depend on it. One experiences any criticism as annihilating regardless of its legitimacy. One remains focused on one's own reflection even when genuine engagement would serve one better. The position has become so entrenched that it operates automatically, unconsciously, destructively—and one lacks the tools to recognise or modify it.
The progression pathway outlined above explains how someone moves from position through pattern toward pathology. It's not that NPD doesn't exist—it's that NPD represents the endpoint of a progression that begins in normal human responses to particular circumstances. Understanding this progression helps one recognise:
First, pathological presentation doesn't require a fundamentally defective personality—just a confluence of circumstances (trauma, attachment disruption, stroke economy deprivation) combined with social reinforcement (environments that reward narcissistic positioning) and absence of interruption (no relationships capable of inviting Adult engagement).
Second, distinguishing pathology from pattern requires attending to flexibility and awareness. Someone operating from pattern can still shift ego states when invited, can still recognise their positioning when it's named, can still respond to feedback about consequences. Someone operating from pathology remains stuck regardless of invitation, cannot recognise their positioning even when explicitly identified, and experiences feedback as attack rather than information.
Third, the 8-step progression pathway identifies precisely where flexibility diminishes and rigidity increases. Steps 1-4 remain highly responsive to context—people can shift positions readily when circumstances change. Steps 5-6 show reduced flexibility—people occupy the position more habitually but can still recognise it with effort. Steps 7-8 approach pathological territory—the position operates almost frequently, with minimal awareness and maximal resistance to feedback.
Here is what this framework adds to clinical diagnosis rather than contradicting it: it shows how someone reaches Step 7 or 8. NPD doesn't emerge from defective personality—it emerges from repeated progression through identifiable stages, accelerated by particular social and relational forces, in the absence of mechanisms that might interrupt that progression.
This matters practically. If narcissism is fixed pathology in defective individuals, our only options are diagnosis, containment, or exclusion. If narcissism is a position that hardens into pattern and sometimes into pathology through identifiable mechanisms, we gain intervention points throughout the progression—and one recognises one's own responsibility for the environments that accelerate or interrupt that progression.
So yes, genuine pathology exists. But even genuine pathology isn't static essence—it's the far end of a dynamic progression most people participate in to varying degrees. The question isn't whether someone "is" narcissistic or "has" NPD. The question is: where are they on the progression pathway, what's maintaining their position there, and what would need to shift to interrupt further progression or invite movement back toward flexibility?
Misogyny emerges through the same progression pathway—from contextual response to systemised contempt:
Step 1-2: Contextual Position
A man feels frustrated with a specific woman in a specific context. Perhaps she's exercising power he resents, perhaps she's rejecting his advances, perhaps she holds opinions he finds threatening. The frustration itself isn't pathological—relationships involve conflict, needs clash, people disappoint each other.
Step 3-5: Social Rehearsal and Generalisation
This is where the pub banter operates. The specific frustration becomes "women are like this"—the position generalises from one woman to women as category. Other men validate the script, share their own versions, collectively construct a narrative about female nature. The stroke economy rewards this progression: recognition for identifying the pattern, belonging through shared grievance, moral status through superior insight.
Manne's (2017, Down Girl) analysis is often crucial here: misogyny isn't hatred of all women everywhere. It's the enforcement mechanism that punishes specific women who violate patriarchal expectations. The man isn't contemptuous of women who conform to his expectations—he may idealise them. He reserves contempt for women who:
McCarthy and Taylor's (2024) research on organisational misogyny demonstrates this precisely: contempt emerges specifically when women occupy leadership roles, exercise decision-making authority, or demonstrate competence in masculine-coded domains. The pattern isn't "all women are inferior"—it's "women who step out of place tends to be brought down."
Step 6-8: Instrumentalisation and Systematic Harm
By this stage, contempt becomes systematic practice. Women who conform receive rewards; women who resist face punishment. The punishment ranges from subtle undermining (questioning competence, withholding recognition, social exclusion) to explicit violence. García-Jiménez et al.'s (2024) systematic review shows this pattern across contexts: objectification, derision, violence, discrediting—four enforcement mechanisms that function to maintain male dominance.
The digital realm intensifies these patterns. Online misogyny operates as collective enforcement: pile-ons, harassment campaigns, doxing, rape threats. Young (2025, "Killing, Killers and Cancelling: The Quiet Disquiet") frames this as "cancellation as social killing"—collective labelling campaigns that function as contemporary pack hunting, isolating targets from support networks, destroying capacity to participate in society. The neural rewards are identical to territorial defence behaviours across species: righteous anger, satisfaction seeing rivals brought down, group bonding through shared enemy.
In TA terms, misogyny typically operates from Critical Parent ego state—judging women against internalised scripts about what women should be, how they should behave, what they deserve. These scripts were learned early and reinforced frequently through cultural transmission. When a woman violates the script, the man in Critical Parent experiences her behaviour as rebellion against legitimate authority, triggering punishment responses.
The progression from contextual frustration to systematic enforcement depends on social reinforcement at Step 3. The individual man's contempt for one woman remains individual—troubling but contained. When that contempt receives validation from other men, when the pub banter rehearses and normalises it, when the stroke economy rewards it—that's when position calcifies into pattern.
Misandry follows the same progression pathway, but typically originates from different context:
Step 1-2: Defensive Positioning
A woman experiences male violence, male entitlement, male dominance—not as abstract concept but as lived reality. Perhaps she's been harassed, assaulted, talked over in meetings, dismissed by male colleagues, underpaid relative to male peers. Her frustration and anger are responses to actual harm, not irrational hostility.
The initial position isn't "all men are terrible"—it's "this man/these men in this context are behaving terribly." The generalisation emerges through repeated experience: if enough individual men behave in similar ways, the pattern begins to feel like intrinsic male nature rather than contextual positioning.
Step 3-5: Social Rehearsal and Identity Formation
Women's groups rehearsing contemptuous scripts about men function identically to men's groups rehearsing contemptuous scripts about women: validating position, removing doubt, accelerating progression. "Men are trash" becomes group consensus, earning strokes for those who articulate it most forcefully.
But there's crucial asymmetry here that feminist scholarship has established: misandry and misogyny don't operate equivalently because they exist within different power structures. As Manne (2017, Down Girl) explains, misogyny is enforcement mechanism within patriarchal system—it has institutional backing and cultural permission. Whilst equality laws have made significant progress since Manne's analysis, particularly across Western jurisdictions in recent years, misogynistic behaviour still frequently operates with reduced consequences compared to equivalent behaviour directed at other protected groups. Misandry is resistance to that system—it lacks institutional power, operates from subordinated position, faces constant cultural pushback.
This doesn't make misandry harmless. Contempt is corrosive regardless of who holds it or why. Individual men encountering blanket condemnation experience real harm—shame, exclusion, defensive anger. Boys growing up hearing "men are trash" internalise that message with psychological consequences. The asymmetry in structural power doesn't negate the reality of individual suffering.
Step 6-8: Instrumentalisation and Exclusion
By late stages, contempt for men becomes organising principle. All male behaviour gets interpreted through contemptuous frame: if he agrees, he's performing allyship for social credit; if he disagrees, he's revealing his misogyny; if he stays silent, he's complicit. There's no position from which a man can engage without confirming the script.
In relationships, this progression creates impossible dynamics. The woman in contemptuous position can't receive genuine engagement from men because she filters all male behaviour through expectation of manipulation, entitlement, or threat. The man responding to her contempt typically shifts into defensive Child (proving he's not like that) or counter-attacking Critical Parent (proving she's unreasonable)—neither of which creates Adult-to-Adult engagement.
Young (2025, "When Helping Hurts") shows how this dynamic operates in professional contexts: women in leadership positions facing persistent misogyny may develop defensive misandry as survival strategy, which then provokes male backlash, which reinforces the need for defensive positioning—a self-perpetuating cycle where most people remains stuck in combative ego states.
The progression from defensive response to systematic contempt follows the same pathway as misogyny: contextual frustration → habituation → social reinforcement → rationalisation → instrumentalisation. The difference lies not in the mechanism but in the power structures within which the progression unfolds.
The 8-step progression pathway reveals a particularly insidious positioning tactic: operating simultaneously at multiple steps whilst claiming to occupy only the most benign. Groomers, bullies, and emotionally manipulative partners all employ variations of this oscillation strategy.
Consider teasing in intimate relationships. A partner makes a cruel comment about weight, intelligence, or appearance—positioning that sits at step 6 (instrumentalisation) or step 7 (indifference to harm). When challenged, they immediately retreat: "I'm just teasing, you know I love you." This verbal recoding repositions the behaviour as step 1 or 2—legitimate affection, contextual playfulness.
The target faces an impossible bind. Their distress response was calibrated to steps 6-7 (genuine contempt), but the perpetrator has retroactively recoded the interaction as steps 1-2 (affection). If the target maintains their complaint, they appear to be "overreacting" to innocent affection. If they dismiss their discomfort, they've just trained themselves to accept contempt disguised as care.
This pattern appears across contexts:
The defence mechanism—"I'm just joking," "It's just banter," "I was just playing"—functions identically across all these contexts. It robs the target of legitimate complaint whilst maintaining the perpetrator's plausible deniability. More insidiously, it trains observers to discount the target's perception: "Can't you take a joke?"
The oscillation itself becomes the primary mechanism of control. Targets learn they cannot trust their own threat assessment. The groomer who oscillates between violating boundaries and claiming special connection leaves the victim perpetually uncertain whether they're experiencing abuse or intimacy. The bullying colleague who alternates between humiliation and "just joking" makes the target doubt whether their distress is justified. The intimate partner who cycles between contempt and claimed affection creates a relationship where the target's perception of reality itself becomes negotiable.
What makes this particularly effective is that the perpetrator typically isn't consciously strategising these oscillations—they're positioning. They occupy step 6-7 contempt genuinely, and they retreat to step 1-2 justification genuinely. The positioning allows them to experience themselves as playful or affectionate whilst their impact registers as contemptuous or harmful. The stroke economy rewards this pattern: others often validate the "just joking" defence, providing social reinforcement for behaviour that functions as systematic harm.
Recognition requires attending not to the perpetrator's claimed positioning but to the pattern of oscillation itself. When someone consistently operates at step 6-7 whilst verbally coding their behaviour as step 1-2, and when challenges consistently trigger retreat to "I didn't mean it that way," the oscillation pattern indicates positioning that has progressed well beyond legitimate contextual response.
This framework faces three substantial objections, each of which deserves direct engagement rather than defensive dismissal.
Objection 1: "This denies that personality disorders exist?"
This objection typically comes from clinicians, researchers, or those who've experienced genuine harm from people with diagnosed personality disorders. Their concern is reasonable: if individuals treat narcissism as a position rather than pathology, doesn't this minimise the very real dysfunction captured in NPD diagnosis?
No—but it does reframe what pathology represents.
Clinical diagnosis serves crucial functions: identifying patterns of dysfunction, predicting likely behaviour, guiding treatment approaches, validating those who've been harmed. Nothing in this framework negates those functions. DSM-5-TR criteria for NPD remain useful descriptors of how someone presents when they've reached the far end of the progression pathway.
What this framework challenges is the implicit assumption that pathological presentation reveals fixed personality defect. Someone who meets NPD criteria isn't fundamentally defective—they've reached Step 7 or 8 on a progression pathway through identifiable mechanisms. The diagnosis describes their current positioning, not their essential nature.
This distinction has therapeutic implications. If NPD is fixed defect, treatment focuses on managing symptoms and protecting others. If NPD is entrenched positioning maintained by specific mechanisms, treatment can address those mechanisms—stroke economy deprivation, absent Adult invitation, environments that continuously reward narcissistic stance.
Moreover, diagnosis becomes more precise when one recognises that most people exhibiting narcissistic behaviours haven't reached pathological levels. They're at Steps 4, 5, or 6—problematic patterns, yes, but still responsive to intervention. Reserving NPD diagnosis for genuine rigidity (Steps 7-8) whilst addressing earlier-stage positioning through relational rather than diagnostic frames serves both clinical precision and therapeutic effectiveness.
Objection 2: "Doesn't 'positions not pathologies' obscure structural oppression?"
This objection typically comes from feminist scholars and activists concerned that symmetrical language—treating misogyny and misandry as equivalent positions—obscures the asymmetrical reality of gendered power and violence.
This concern is predominantly legitimate. Misogyny operates within and enforces patriarchal structures. It has institutional backing, historical precedent, material consequence. Women face systematic violence, exclusion, and subordination that men as a category do not. Treating misogyny and misandry as symmetrical positions risks false equivalence—suggesting comparable harm when the evidence contradicts this.
But here is what the framework actually proposes: misogyny and misandry are both positions people occupy, but they operate within radically different structures with radically different consequences.
A woman occupying misandrist positioning (contempt toward men as category) operates without institutional backing, without systematic violence apparatus, without historical precedent for large-scale harm against men as a group. Her contempt might be individually unjust, might harm specific men in specific contexts—but it doesn't participate in structural oppression because no such structure exists targeting men.
A man occupying misogynist positioning operates within extensive institutional backing, participates in systematic violence apparatus, draws on historical precedent for large-scale harm against women. His contempt isn't merely individual—it activates and reinforces existing structures of oppression.
The framework doesn't claim symmetrical harm. It claims symmetrical psychological mechanisms (positions, ego states, progression pathways) operating within asymmetrical social structures producing asymmetrical consequences.
Understanding this distinction helps one see that combating misogyny requires addressing both individual positioning and structural arrangements, whilst combating misandry primarily requires addressing individual positioning. The positions may be psychologically similar, but their structural embedding and social consequences differ dramatically.
Objection 3: "Doesn't this framework excuse harmful behaviour?"
This objection emerges across the political spectrum: if narcissism/misogyny/misandrist are positions rather than pathologies, doesn't this remove accountability? Doesn't it suggest "everyone does it" therefore few individuals's responsible?
Generally not—though it is understandable why the framework might seem to imply this.
Recognising that most people occupy these positions sometimes doesn't eliminate accountability—it sharpens it. The question shifts from "is one fundamentally defective?" to "what position is one occupying, how often, with what awareness, and with what consequences?"
Someone at Step 3 (occasionally self-absorbed under stress) is less accountable than someone at Step 6 (habitually contemptuous despite awareness of harm). Someone occupying misogynist positioning unconsciously in a culture saturating them with such messages is less accountable than someone occupying that position consciously and deliberately. Someone who recognises their positioning when named and makes efforts to shift is more accountable than someone who denies their positioning and doubles down.
Accountability becomes more nuanced, more contextual—but not less real. Indeed, the framework increases accountability by making it harder to dismiss harmful behaviour as evidence of defective others. If most people move through these positions, we're all responsible for noticing when individuals're doing so, examining what maintains our positioning, and interrupting progression down the pathway.
Moreover, consequences remain appropriate regardless of positioning. Someone causing harm through narcissistic behaviour at Step 6 should still experience consequences—not because they're fundamentally defective, but because behaviour has consequences regardless of its psychological origins. The difference is that consequences become learning opportunities rather than punishment for defectiveness.
The framework doesn't excuse harmful behaviour. It explains how people reach the point of habitual harm, identifies intervention points before pathology solidifies, and distributes accountability across individuals and the systems that shape their positioning—rather than locating all fault in defective personalities.
There's another layer to how these labels function: projection of one's own unacceptable impulses onto others. Carl Jung (1959, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious) termed this the "shadow"—the parts of oneself one refuses to acknowledge, containing impulses and characteristics found unacceptable. Jung argued that what individuals cannot face in themselves, they project onto others, allowing condemnation externally of what is denied internally. This offers insight into why identification of narcissists and misogynists elsewhere proves so appealing whilst similar tendencies in oneself go unexamined.
Consider: most people have narcissistic impulses. Most people have moments of contempt toward groups who frustrate or threaten them. Most people occupy positions they would rather not examine. But acknowledging this feels dangerous—it threatens one's identity as a good person, one's standing in social groups that reward moral certainty, one's carefully constructed self-image.
So individuals project. Narcissism, misogyny, misandry get located out there, in those other people who are genuinely defective. This allows individuals to:
Young (2025, "When Helping Hurts") discusses scapegoating as cultural mechanism for managing collective shadow material. Historical examples are obvious: witch hunts, religious persecution, political purges. Contemporary examples are subtler but follow identical pattern. Consider how football club owners fire managers when results decline—not because the manager suddenly became incompetent, but because he can carry the collective failure. Most people else remains blameless; the scapegoat absorbs the shame.
The same mechanism operates in online "cancellation" culture. Young (2025, "Killing, Killers and Cancelling: The Quiet Disquiet") frames cancellation as social killing—collective labelling campaigns that isolate targets from support networks and destroy capacity to participate in society. This looks like moral action (holding wrongdoers accountable) but often functions as shadow projection (exiling the person who embodies what individuals cannot accept in themselves).
The intensity of the attack frequently reveals the projection. When someone responds to minor transgression with disproportionate fury, when the pile-on exceeds any reasonable scale of accountability—that's shadow material in action. The target has touched something unexamined in the collective psyche, and the group responds with elimination rather than integration.
This doesn't mean all accusations of narcissism or misogyny are projections. Sometimes people genuinely do occupy harmful positions persistently. But the eagerness with which individuals deploy these labels, the satisfaction felt in identifying them, the righteous anger that accompanies condemnation—these suggest shadow dynamics at work.
What makes contemporary discourse particularly toxic is how projection operates symmetrically, creating escalating cycles of mutual labelling. Those who've been harmed by labels adopt labelling as weapon of resistance—but in doing so, replicate the very mechanism that harmed them.
Consider the pattern:
Each side experiences their labelling as justified resistance to oppression. Each side experiences the other's labelling as unfair attack. Both are right—and both are wrong. The labels flow in both directions, each side convinced their diagnostic certainty is accurate whilst the other's is projection.
This creates escalation loops where:
The result is identity warfare where most people embrace being a labeller. The discourse becomes predominantly diagnostic: proving they're narcissists/misogynists/racists/woke. Few individuals occupies Adult state—most people's in Critical Parent (judging) or Adapted Child (defending). The possibility of examining actual positions, actual behaviours, actual contexts disappears beneath waves of essentialist categorisation.
This is shadow projection operating at collective scale, with each side convinced they're merely identifying what's actually there whilst unable to see their own participation in the dynamic. The person who's been labelled "misogynist" feels the injustice of reduction to pathology—then turns around and labels his critics "misandrist" without noticing the symmetry. The feminist who's fought against essentialist gender categories deploys essentialist categories about men. Most people projects shadow material whilst experiencing themselves as merely seeing clearly.
The tragedy is that genuine harm exists on all sides. Women experiencing systematic misogyny aren't imagining it. Men feeling unfairly generalised aren't making it up. People facing racism encounter real violence. Those accused of bigotry sometimes face genuine unfairness. But the recursive labelling prevents addressing any of it—most people's too busy proving the other side's pathology to examine their own positioning.
These positions don't exist in isolation—they emerge and persist through relationship dynamics where each person's stance invokes and reinforces the other's. TA calls these patterns "games": predictable sequences where each party typically plays their assigned role, few individuals gets what they actually want, and the pattern repeats endlessly.
The narcissist-empath game:
He occupies narcissistic position (self-focus, need for admiration, limited empathy). She responds from Rescuer position in Karpman's (1968, "Fairy tales and script drama analysis") drama triangle—believing she can heal him through sufficient love and understanding. His narcissistic behaviour intensifies because it receives attention. Her rescuing intensifies because she interprets his increased need as evidence she's getting through to him. Both are stuck—he in demanding Child, she in rescuing Parent—with no Adult-to-Adult engagement possible.
This isn't about two defective people finding each other. It's about two complementary positions that lock together. Without her rescuing, his narcissistic demands would face consequences. Without his demands, her rescuing identity has no purpose. Each position maintains the other.
The misogynist-feminist game:
He occupies misogynistic position (contempt for female authority, enforcement of traditional gender roles). She responds with feminist critique (challenging male dominance, demanding equality). His contempt intensifies because her challenge confirms his script (women are unreasonable, demanding, threatening). Her challenge intensifies because his contempt confirms her script (men are entitled, defensive, unchangeable). Both are stuck in oppositional positions—he defending patriarchal order, she resisting it—with neither able to shift into genuine dialogue.
This doesn't mean both positions are equivalent—misogyny operates within structures of power that give it material consequences feminism doesn't have. But the relational dynamic still operates: each position provokes and justifies the other, making genuine Adult-to-Adult engagement impossible.
The misandry-men's rights game:
She occupies misandrist position (contempt for male entitlement, defence against male harm). He responds with men's rights rhetoric (claiming reverse discrimination, demanding recognition of male suffering). Her contempt intensifies because his claims confirm her script (men can't handle not being centred, typically making themselves victims). His defensiveness intensifies because her contempt confirms his script (feminists hate men, men's real issues get ignored). Both stuck in defensive positions—she in Critical Parent judging male inadequacy, he in rebellious Child demanding recognition.
The stroke economy reinforces each position: her feminist group rewards contempt for male fragility, his men's rights group rewards defence against feminist excess. Neither receives strokes for Adult engagement with the other's actual experience.
An unexpected domain offers insight into position versus pathology: research on sexual fluidity. For decades, sexual orientation was treated as fixed identity—one IS gay, straight, or bisexual. Contemporary research reveals far more fluidity, particularly among women.
Diamond (2008, 2016) documents how many women's attractions and identities shift across lifespan and context. A woman might identify as exclusively heterosexual, then develop romantic feelings for a female friend, then return to heterosexual orientation, then identify as bisexual—none of these representing the "true" identity beneath surface variation. Each represents authentic position at that time in that context.
A systematic review of same-sex behaviour research (Walters et al., 2025) confirms this pattern across multiple studies: significant portions of people reporting same-sex attraction or behaviour at one timepoint report different patterns later. This isn't repression or denial—it's genuine fluidity in how attraction operates across circumstances, relationships, developmental stages.
Why does this matter for understanding narcissism, misogyny, misandry? Because it reveals something crucial about the relationship between behaviour, social positioning, and identity—and how readily we collapse these into essentialist categories, especially during moments of social anxiety or moral panic.
Consider the 1970s-80s cultural landscape in Britain. Following the Sexual Offences Act 1967's partial decriminalisation of homosexual acts in England and Wales, gay culture began emerging into semi-visibility: glam rock's overt gender play, disco's coded gay spaces, the broader counterculture that grew around gay communities. This created a window where many people engaged in these scenes not because of their sexual activity patterns, but because of cultural alliance—these communities offered refuge from mainstream conformity, space for experimentation, belonging for the castigated. Sexual activity could sit separately from sexual alliance. One didn't have to be gay to position yourself within gay culture; one didn't have to engage in same-sex behaviour to adopt the aesthetic, the politics, the social stance.
But the AIDS crisis in the 1980s collapsed this distinction violently. As Weeks (1989, "AIDS: The intellectual agenda") documents, media panic and UK Conservative governmental hostility—driven by a political base often characterised by xenophobic and morally traditionalist attitudes—culminated in Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 prohibiting "promotion of homosexuality". This governmental positioning, mirrored in other Western countries (notably the USA under Reagan), transformed social positioning into pathological identity through state apparatus. Frequenting gay spaces meant one WAS gay, being gay meant one WAS diseased, being diseased meant one WAS dangerous. The labels got weaponised again. The fluidity of positioning hardened back into rigid identity categories used for exclusion, quarantine, dehumanisation. Moral panic re-imposed essentialist thinking: behaviour revealed positioning revealed identity revealed pathology.
This historical pattern illuminates how labels function when those in power exploit social anxiety. When political authorities frame perceived threats to mobilise their base, the nuanced distinctions collapse. Complex positioning gets reduced to binary identity. Identity gets conflated with pathology. And pathology justifies exclusion.
This reveals a three-way distinction that essentialist models collapse:
Behaviour: What someone actually does (sexual acts, narcissistic actions, contemptuous statements)
Positioning: Where someone locates themself socially and culturally (alliance with communities, adoption of stances, relational dynamics)
Identity: How someone understands their fundamental nature (I AM gay, I AM a narcissist, I AM a misogynist)
Essentialism treats these as unified: if one engages in the behaviour, one must occupy the position, which reveals one's identity. But they're separable. Someone can:
The sexual fluidity research matters because it demonstrates this separation empirically. People's sexual behaviour, their social positioning within sexual communities, and their identity labels don't typically align. And crucially, all three can shift across time and context whilst remaining authentic at each point.
The parallel to narcissist/misogynist/misandrist labels is direct—and contemporary social media operates like the AIDS panic did, collapsing all distinction during moments of moral urgency. Someone engages in self-focused behaviour during legitimate crisis → observers note the positioning → label them "narcissist" as identity → treat them as pathologically defective → justify exclusion or attack. The same collapse: behaviour becomes positioning becomes identity becomes pathology becomes target.
The parallel to narcissism, misogyny, misandry is direct: we treat these as essential identities that explain behaviour, when they're better understood as positions people occupy—social and relational stances that emerge from context, serve particular functions, and shift as circumstances change. The behaviour may occur. The positioning may be adopted. But neither necessarily reflects fixed identity or permanent pathology.
The research on sexual fluidity doesn't claim orientation is choice—people don't choose their attractions. Similarly, narcissistic or contemptuous positions aren't freely chosen—they emerge from temperament, experience, relational dynamics, cultural context. But in both domains, the essentialist move—from observing behaviour or positioning to diagnosing permanent identity—obscures the actual complexity of how humans navigate social reality.
What the fluidity research establishes is that attraction patterns, social positioning, and identity labels can all shift in ways that defy essentialist models whilst remaining authentic throughout. The same applies to narcissistic and contemptuous positioning: people can occupy these stances at Step 3 today and Adult engagement tomorrow, can position themselves within misogynistic culture whilst maintaining capacity for genuine respect toward women, can engage in narcissistic behaviour during seasons of necessary self-focus without this reflecting permanent character.
The point isn't that everything is fluid and nothing matters. The point is that positions are not pathologies—and conflating the two, especially during moments of social anxiety when labels get weaponised, prevents us from understanding how positions emerge, what maintains them, and how they might shift. The AIDS crisis showed how quickly nuanced understanding collapses into essentialist labelling during moral panic. Contemporary cancel culture and diagnostic discourse show the same pattern: complexity reduced to pathology, positioning reduced to identity, humanity reduced to label.
There's one more dimension individuals typically need to understand: the biological basis for collective labelling and exclusion. Young (2025, "Killing, Killers and Cancelling: The Quiet Disquiet") explores cancellation as social killing, but the mechanism he identifies isn't modern innovation—it's ancient human survival strategy.
The biological substrate of belonging operates through identifiable mechanisms. Dunbar (2010, "The social role of touch in humans and primates") demonstrates how social touch and proximity activate neurochemical systems—particularly oxytocin—that create powerful feelings of group membership. Tajfel and Turner (1979, "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict") showed that even arbitrary group assignments rapidly generate in-group preference and out-group derogation. For most of human evolutionary history, exile from the group meant death. We're not adapted for solitary survival; we're adapted for collective living. This created intense selection pressure for:
Contemporary "cancellation" maps precisely onto these ancient patterns. When someone is collectively labeled as narcissist or misogynist, what follows is:
This isn't conscious strategy—it's automatic biological response. The neural circuitry that evolved for identifying and eliminating genuine threats to group survival now activates for perceived moral violations. The person labeled as narcissist triggers the same pack-hunting response as the person who once hoarded food during famine or betrayed the tribe to enemies.
Young (2025, "Killing, Killers and Cancelling: The Quiet Disquiet") notes that this presents as moral action but operates as biological imperative. We believe we're holding wrongdoers accountable; we're experiencing the neurochemical satisfaction of successful territorial defence. The stroke economy rewards this intensely: those who identify the threat receive recognition, those who participate in exclusion receive belonging, those who express moral outrage most forcefully receive status.
This is why these labels are so seductive—they activate ancient circuitry that feels deeply right. Identifying the narcissist, condemning the misogynist, excluding the misandrist—these produce neurochemical rewards that bypass conscious reasoning. We're not engaging Adult assessment of contextual positioning; we're experiencing Child-state satisfaction of successful pack hunting from within Critical Parent's moral certainty.
The UK Post Office Horizon scandal illuminates something crucial about the progression pathway: it operates symmetrically. The executive who caused harm followed one progression. The public responding to that harm follows another. Both progressions follow identical mechanisms. Both parties become trapped in binary thinking. Both fail to recognise where they're standing on their respective pathways.
Between 1999 and 2015, the Post Office prosecuted over 700 sub-postmasters for theft, fraud, and false accounting based on data from their Horizon IT system. The system was faulty. The prosecutions were unjust. Lives were destroyed—bankruptcies, imprisonments, suicides, families torn apart. When this eventually became public, the question most people asked was: how did this happen? How did executives, lawyers, communications staff—all presumably decent people—allow this to continue for so long?
The progression pathway provides the answer. But it also reveals something most commentary misses: the public's response to the scandal follows the same pathway, with potentially its own harmful consequences.
Steps 1-2: Legitimate Organisational Concern
"We need to protect the integrity of our IT system and organisational reputation." This is reasonable starting point. Organisations face genuine threats—fraud does occur, systems do need defending, institutional credibility matters. Paula Vennells and others didn't begin with malicious intent. They began with legitimate concern.
Step 3: Social Reinforcement
Board meetings, legal teams, communications staff, IT consultants—all validating the position that Horizon was reliable and the sub-postmasters tends to be at fault. Stroke economy rewards for "protecting the organisation," for "maintaining standards," for "not being soft on criminals." Every meeting reinforced the position. Every legal victory confirmed it. Every colleague who raised doubts either fell silent (stroke withdrawal threat) or left (eliminated from the reinforcing environment).
Step 4: Empathic Attenuation
The sub-postmasters stopped being real people with families, mortgages, reputations. They became abstractions—"the cases," "the defendants," "the fraudsters." Distance created by organisational hierarchy, legal processes, corporate communications. Each prosecution made the next one easier because empathic capacity atrophied through repeated non-engagement with actual human impact.
Step 5: Rationalisation
"These people are criminals—they're lying to avoid accountability. Our system can't be wrong—one would know if there were problems. They brought this on themselves. We're just doing our jobs, following proper procedures, maintaining integrity." The position acquired moral justification and became integrated into identity. Questioning it would require dismantling entire self-concept as responsible professional.
Step 6: Instrumentalisation
Sub-postmasters became threats to be neutralised, problems to be managed, not people to engage with. Their letters, their evidence, their pleas—all became obstacles to organisational priorities rather than information deserving genuine consideration. They existed as means to the end of protecting institutional reputation.
Step 7: Indifference to Harm
Awareness that prosecutions were happening, that lives were being destroyed, that families were suffering—but "they brought this on themselves, we're following correct procedures, collateral damage is inevitable, one can't let sentiment override protocol." The capacity for guilt (behaviour-focused correction) diminished. What remained was defensive rationalisation against external criticism.
Step 8: Active Enforcement Despite Knowledge
By later stages, enough internal evidence suggested system problems. Legal teams knew. IT consultants knew. Some executives knew. Yet prosecutions continued because admitting error would be too costly—financially, reputationally, personally. This is active harm in full knowledge of its nature.
Now observe the public response when this became widely known:
Steps 1-2: Legitimate Moral Response
"This person caused massive harm and tends to be held accountable." Accurate observation. Justified anger. Appropriate demand for justice. The sub-postmasters deserve recognition, compensation, vindication. The executives deserve consequences. This is Step 1-2—reasonable response to genuine harm.
Step 3: Social Reinforcement
News coverage, social media, online forums—collective validation of outrage. Stroke economy rewards for moral clarity: "One is right to be angry, she's a monster, most people see it, anyone defending her is complicit." Each comment reinforces the position. Each shared article confirms it. The collective rehearsal accelerates progression.
Paula Vennells became particular focus—former CEO, ordained priest in Church of England, CBE recipient. The contrasts made her symbolically powerful: religious leader who destroyed lives, honoured citizen who committed institutional violence, woman in authority who abused power. Perfect target for collective fury.
Step 4: Empathic Attenuation
Vennells stopped being a person who progressed down a pathway and became a symbol—"The Narcissist," "The Psychopath," "The Liar," "The Monster." Capacity to see her as human—someone who made catastrophic errors while maintaining internal narrative of acting reasonably—diminished through repeated rehearsal of contemptuous script.
Commentary used terms like "evil," "wicked," "sociopath"—diagnostic categories applied without expertise, stripping away humanity, reducing complex progression to simple pathology. The binary trap completed: she IS bad, fundamentally defective, irredeemably other.
Step 5: Rationalisation
"She's just evil—there's no other explanation for this behaviour. Anyone trying to understand the progression is making excuses, defending the indefensible, enabling harm." The public's position became morally justified, unquestionable. Nuanced analysis got framed as moral failure.
The stroke economy reinforced this powerfully. Those who expressed strongest condemnation received most validation. Those who suggested examining mechanisms rather than just condemning character risked accusations of defending perpetrators. The biological pressure toward simple moral certainty became harder to resist than intellectual recognition of complexity.
Step 6: Instrumentalisation
Vennells became useful—as scapegoat, as example, as target for collective rage. She existed to serve the public's need for clear villains and righteous satisfaction. Her actual humanity, her capacity for growth or recognition, her potential for genuine accountability—all became irrelevant. She was no longer person but symbol to be deployed.
Step 7: Indifference to Proportionate Response
Awareness that online pile-ons cause genuine suffering, that disproportionate response creates new forms of harm, that mob justice rarely produces actual accountability—but "she deserves it, she brought this on herself, it's justice not cruelty, thinking about her suffering is misplaced sympathy."
Young (2025, "Killing, Killers and Cancelling: The Quiet Disquiet") documents how cancellation functions as social killing—deliberate destruction of capacity to participate in society, satisfaction in seeing target isolated and ruined, moral righteousness about the destruction. The public's indifference to whether response matches transgression mirrors the very indifference they condemn in Vennells.
Step 8: Active Destruction as Moral Duty
Calls for her to be stripped of titles, banned from ministry, prosecuted criminally, socially ostracised permanently. Not as necessary consequences following due process, but as collective satisfaction in destroying her. The neural rewards are identical to those Young (2025, "Killing, Killers and Cancelling: The Quiet Disquiet") identifies in cancellation culture: righteous anger (territorial defence), satisfaction seeing rivals brought down (status competition), group bonding through shared enemy (coalition maintenance).
Both parties—executive and public—progress down identical pathway:
Both are trapped in binary thinking:
Vennells: "Admitting I caused harm = admitting I'm bad = reconstructing entire identity = unthinkable"
Public: "She caused harm + denies it = she IS bad = destruction justified = proportionality irrelevant"
Neither recognises their own progression. Neither sees the social reinforcement accelerating their journey. Neither notices the stroke economy rewards maintaining their position. Neither catches the rationalisation blinding them to where they're standing.
The public locates "badness" predominantly in Vennells while failing to recognise parallel dynamics in themselves:
Meanwhile, Vennells projects "unreasonableness" onto critics, fails to recognise her own progression that caused harm initially. At the inquiry, she repeatedly said "I am sorry for what happened" (passive construction, Step 1-2 framing) but struggled to say "I am sorry for the harm I caused" (active responsibility, acknowledgment of progression).
The physicist Steven Weinberg famously asked: "What does it take for good people to do wicked things?" His answer, frequently cited by Christopher Hitchens (2007, God Is Not Great) in debates about religion, was: "In the ordinary moral universe, the good will do the best they can, the worst will do the worst they can, but if you want to make good people do wicked things, you'll need religion."
Hitchens (2007, God Is Not Great) used this formulation as part of his broader argument that religion is fundamentally totalitarian—not metaphorically, but structurally. He argued that religious doctrine creates the framework for overriding humane thinking: when divine command supersedes human welfare, otherwise caring people perform cruel, painful, unnecessary, and harmful acts. Hitchens focused extensively on female genital mutilation as exemplar—mothers and grandmothers inflicting lifelong harm on daughters and granddaughters not from malice or ignorance of the pain caused, but because religious instruction overrides what they would otherwise recognise as obviously harmful. The doctrine provides absolute authority beyond question, punishment for doubt, and most crucially, binary categorisation of humanity into those who obey divine law and those who violate it.
The totalitarian mindset, as Hitchens (2007, God Is Not Great) described it and Arendt (1951, The Origins of Totalitarianism) analysed in depth, requires identification with the chosen group whilst viewing those outside that group as fundamentally other—defective, dangerous, deserving of exclusion. The mechanism operates through collective agreement about who belongs and who doesn't, who obeys and who transgresses, who is righteous and who is condemned.
But the progression pathway reveals something Hitchens didn't fully articulate: one doesn't need religious doctrine to create this dynamic where instructions override humane thinking. The Post Office scandal demonstrates that thoroughly secular concerns—organisational reputation, corporate loyalty, professional identity—can produce identical override of obvious harm through identical mechanisms.
Vennells wasn't motivated by theology. She was motivated by organisational protection. Yet she progressed through exactly the same stages:
And the public response mirrors the same structure Hitchens identified in religious harm: the instruction (Vennells must be punished) overrides humane thinking about proportionality, binary categorisation (Vennells IS evil, fundamentally defective, irredeemably other) replaces nuanced assessment, collective righteousness removes space for reflection, and satisfaction in destruction gets experienced as moral duty.
Hitchens was right that religion can accelerate this progression—providing explicit divine doctrine that overrides human welfare assessment, authoritative validation that cannot be questioned, transcendent justification that removes normal constraints. When a mother performs FGM on her daughter, she's following instructions that override what she would otherwise recognise as obvious harm. The religious framework provides the mechanism for that override.
But he was wrong that religion is uniquely capable of producing it. Any social system that creates overriding instructions—doctrines, procedures, ideologies, professional standards—that supersede direct assessment of human welfare can produce the same progression. Corporate culture, political ideology, professional identity, nationalist movements, even progressive activism—all can function like religious systems, providing instructions that override humane thinking, creating categories of compliance and transgression, and offering satisfaction in enforcing those categories.
The mechanism isn't specifically religious or specifically political. It's human. And recognising that matters enormously, because it means individuals are all vulnerable—religious or secular, left or right, institutional or anti-institutional. Hitchens spent his career fighting totalitarianism, yet his own support for the Iraq War suggests he wasn't immune to the very instruction-override he critiqued. The righteous certainty that "Islamofascism" represented absolute evil, that intervention represented absolute good—this too created instructions that overrode humane assessment of the actual human cost of bombing campaigns.
The progression operates wherever humans create instructions—religious doctrines, organisational procedures, ideological commitments, professional standards—that override direct assessment of human welfare. Religion does this through divine command. But so does everything else individuals use to organise collective life. The dangerous impulse isn't belief in God—it's following any instruction system that supersedes recognition of obvious harm, maintained through social reinforcement that makes questioning feel like betrayal.
This is why the labels narcissist/misogynist/misandrist function as they do. They're not just clinical descriptions gone wrong. They're totalitarian categorisations—ways of sorting humanity into the righteous and the defective, the human and the pathological, the salvageable and the irredeemable. And once someone is labelled, once they're placed in the "defective" category, the progression can proceed: empathic attenuation (they stop being fully human), rationalisation (they brought this on themselves), indifference to proportionate response (they deserve whatever happens), and finally, active destruction experienced as moral duty (cancellation as social killing).
Hitchens asked what it takes for good people to do wicked things. The progression pathway provides the answer—and it's more universal and more terrifying than he suggested. It doesn't require religion. It requires only humans doing what humans do: creating in-groups and out-groups, reinforcing those distinctions through stroke economy rewards, and progressing from reasonable concerns toward systematic harm whilst maintaining internal narrative of righteousness at every step.
The question isn't whether we're vulnerable to this. The question is: where are we on the pathway right now, and what would interrupt our progression before we reach the stages that Hitchens rightly identified as totalitarian?
Good people don't suddenly become wicked. They occupy increasingly harmful positions while maintaining internal narrative that they're still reasonable, still justified, still the same decent person they typically were.
Both the executive and the public exemplify this.
The framework isn't just for analysing perpetrators of harm. It's for examining how YOU respond to perpetrators of harm. Because that response follows the same progression pathway, operates through identical mechanisms, produces potentially its own harmful consequences.
Legitimate accountability can progress into collective destruction. Justified anger can harden into dehumanising contempt. Moral clarity can calcify into binary thinking that forecloses understanding. The very response meant to address harm can create new forms of harm through identical progression.
This doesn't mean abandoning accountability. Vennells and her colleagues DID cause massive harm. Justice and consequences remain necessary. But it means recognising:
The mirror doesn't just reflect narcissistic, misogynistic, or misandrist positions. It reflects how one responds to those positions in others—because that response itself can progress down identical pathway.
Vennells couldn't see her progression because social reinforcement, stroke economy, and rationalisation blinded her. The public risks not seeing their own progression for identical reasons.
The framework offers escape from this symmetrical blindness—but only if applied to both sides of every dynamic, including one's own righteous responses to others' wrongdoing.
So where does this leave one? If narcissism, misogyny, and misandry are positions rather than pathologies, if most people occupy these stances in various contexts, if social reinforcement accelerates progression from position to pattern, if one's eagerness to label others reveals shadow material one can't claim—what then?
First recognition: Most people move through these positions.
The question isn't whether one ever occupy narcissistic or contemptuous stances. One does. The question is: how often, in what contexts, with what awareness, with what progression risk, with what social reinforcement?
Second recognition: Positions can harden into patterns.
The eight-step progression isn't inevitable, but it's common. What begins as legitimate self-care (Step 1) can progress through habituation, social reinforcement, rationalisation, instrumentalisation, indifference, and finally exploitation (Step 8). The pub banter, the online pile-on, the stroke economy rewards—these aren't neutral. They're greasing the pathway from position to pattern.
Third recognition: Individuals are all vulnerable to collective dynamics.
The biological pull toward pack hunting, the neurochemical rewards for territorial defence, the stroke economy pressure to conform—these operate below conscious awareness. When individuals participate in collective labeling and exclusion, one is not primarily engaging moral reasoning; one is responding to ancient imperatives that ensured survival.
Fourth recognition: Shadow projection distorts one's vision.
The intensity with which one condemn narcissists and misogynists often reflects unexamined material in ourselves. The person who most vehemently denies ever occupying these positions is often the person least aware of when they do so.
Fifth recognition: Adult engagement requires different approach.
Rather than Parent condemnation ("one is a narcissist") or Child defensiveness ("I'm not like that"), Adult engagement asks:
Sixth recognition: Behavioural description beats identity diagnosis.
"One is behaving narcissistically in this context" maintains possibility of dialogue and change. "One is a narcissist" ends conversation and forecloses shift. The former invites examination; the latter demands defence.
Seventh recognition: Structural patterns require structural analysis.
Individual positions exist within broader systems. Misogyny isn't just individual men's contempt—it's systematic enforcement mechanism with institutional backing. Addressing it requires both individual awareness (noticing when individuals occupy contemptuous positions) and collective action (dismantling structures that reward and protect misogynistic patterns). Neither level suffices alone.
Eighth recognition: Individuals are responsible for noticing where one stand on the pathway.
The progression from position to pattern to pathology isn't inevitable, but it's common enough to warrant vigilance. One cannot avoid occupying narcissistic or contemptuous positions—they're part of human repertoire. But one can notice:
Catching ourselves at Step 3-4 is very different from recognising one've reached Step 7-8. Early intervention interrupts progression; late-stage patterns require more profound work.
Understanding narcissism, misogyny, and misandry as positions rather than pathologies doesn't excuse harmful behaviour. But more importantly, it doesn't excuse the progression from position to pattern. These terms function in contemporary discourse primarily as weapons—grenades thrown to end discussions, establish moral superiority, and exclude people from consideration.
But they could function as mirrors—tools for examining when and how individuals occupy these stances, what social forces reinforce them, where one stands on the progression pathway, and what might interrupt the journey from legitimate starting points toward harmful endpoints.
Most people occupy narcissistic positions: seasons of necessary self-focus, moments when others' needs genuinely cannot be one's priority, contexts where one's own survival or wellbeing rightly comes first. The question isn't whether this occurs—it's whether one notices when legitimate self-care is hardening into habitual self-preference, when self-preference is calcifying through social rehearsal into self-absorption, when self-absorption is progressing toward instrumentalisation of others.
Most people occupy contemptuous positions toward groups who threaten or frustrate them. Men encountering women who challenge male dominance, women encountering men who enforce patriarchal expectations—both may respond with contempt. The question isn't whether this frequently occurs—it's whether one notices when contextual frustration is generalising into group-based contempt, when that contempt is receiving social validation that accelerates its progression, when individuals are moving from defensive positioning toward systematic exclusion.
The mirror's value isn't in admitting "yes, I sometimes prioritise myself" or "yes, I sometimes feel contempt toward men/women." That's obvious—humans are fallible. The mirror's value is in asking:
These are Adult questions—present-moment assessment of actual circumstances rather than Parent judgment ("one is defective") or Child defence ("I'm not like that"). They're also uncomfortable questions, because honest answers reveal how much most people participate in dynamics they would rather attribute to defective others.
But discomfort is the price of genuine examination. As long as these terms remain grenades thrown at others, they'll continue generating heat without light—moral satisfaction without understanding, social division without growth, collective shadow projection without integration.
And here is the most disturbing recognition: contemporary culture has emerged where most people embrace being a labeller. Those who've been harmed by diagnostic categorisation adopt the same weapon against their opponents. The feminist fighting misogynist labelling deploys narcissist accusations. The man resisting toxic masculinity stereotypes responds with misandrist claims. The anti-racist combating bigotry wields "xenophobe" and "nationalist." Those labelled "woke" counter with their own diagnostic arsenal.
Most people are convinced their labelling is justified whilst the other's is projection. Most people are certain they're identifying what's actually there whilst unable to see their own positioning. The discourse becomes predominantly diagnostic—proving they're fundamentally defective rather than examining what positions most people occupy, what contexts activate them, what social forces maintain them.
This recursive labelling trap ensures the progression pathway accelerates in all directions simultaneously. Both sides receive stroke economy rewards for labelling. Both sides experience themselves as merely seeing clearly. Both sides project shadow material whilst denying they're doing so. And few individuals notice they're standing at Step 5 or 6 on their own progression pathway whilst condemning others for reaching Step 7 or 8 on theirs.
The alternative is treating them as what they actually describe: positions most people occupy, with varying frequency and flexibility, in varying contexts and with varying consequences, along pathways that can progress from legitimate responses toward genuinely harmful patterns—but only if individuals fail to notice where they stand and what forces are pushing them forward. That noticing is the work.
American Psychiatric Association (2022). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed., text rev.). Washington, DC: Author.
Arendt, H. (1951). The origins of totalitarianism. Harcourt Brace.
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193-209.
Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Moral Education, 31(2), 101-119.
Berne, E. (2016). Transactional analysis in psychotherapy: A systematic individual and social psychiatry. Pickle Partners Publishing. (Original work published 1961)
Brown, B. (2006). Shame resilience theory: A grounded theory study on women and shame. Families in Society, 87(1), 43-52.
Diamond, L. M. (2008). Sexual fluidity: Understanding women's love and desire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Diamond, L. M. (2016). Sexual fluidity in male and females. Current Sexual Health Reports, 8(4), 249-256.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2010). The social role of touch in humans and primates: Behavioural function and neurobiological mechanisms. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 34(2), 260-268.
García-Jiménez, L., Aguaded, I., & Morell, A. (2024). Online misogyny: A systematic review. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace, 18(1), Article 5.
Gori, A., & Topino, E. (2025). A network analysis of pathological narcissism: Exploring core features and connections with psychological distress and well-being in a community sample. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 81(2), 434-451.
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 252-264.
Hitchens, C. (2007). God is not great: How religion poisons everything. Twelve Books.
Holland, J. (2006). Misogyny: The world's oldest prejudice. London: Robinson.
Jung, C. G. (1959). The archetypes and the collective unconscious (R. F. C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1934)
Karpman, S. B. (1968). Fairy tales and script drama analysis. Transactional Analysis Bulletin, 7(26), 39-43.
Local Government Act 1988, c. 9, § 28 (UK).
Manne, K. (2017). Down girl: The logic of misogyny. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McCarthy, J., & Taylor, P. (2024). When the exception proves the rule: Misogyny in practice and women in senior leadership. Gender, Work & Organization, 31(3), 851-872.
Sexual Offences Act 1967, c. 60 (UK).
Steiner, C. (1971). The stroke economy. Transactional Analysis Journal, 1(3), 9-15.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47). Brooks/Cole.
Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. (2002). Shame and guilt. Guilford Press.
Walters, G. D., Morgan, R. D., & Spohn, C. (2025). Same-sex behaviour over time: A systematic review of research on continuity and discontinuity. Archives of Sexual Behaviour, 54(1), 111-126.
Weeks, J. (1989). AIDS: The intellectual agenda. In P. Aggleton, G. Hart, & P. Davies (Eds.), AIDS: Social representations, social practices (pp. 1-20). Falmer Press.
Wrisley, M. (2023). Feminist standpoint theory and misogyny. In A. S. Laden (Ed.), Feminist philosophy: From theory to liberation (pp. 265-280). New York: Routledge.
Young, S. (2025). The Reality: A Children's Services Case Study - Changing People: A Psychological Impossibility - Part 1. YoungFamilyLife.
Young, S. (2025). Why Trying to Change People Never Works - Changing People: A Psychological Impossibility - Part 2. YoungFamilyLife.
Young, S. (2025). The Evolutionary Roots of Resistance - Changing People: A Psychological Impossibility - Part 3. YoungFamilyLife.
Young, S. (2025). When Helping Hurts: The Professional's Dilemma - Changing People: A Psychological Impossibility - Part 4. YoungFamilyLife.
Young, S. (2025). Influence and Adaptation: What Darwin Actually Taught Us - Changing People: A Psychological Impossibility - Part 5. YoungFamilyLife.
Young, S. (2025). Killing, Killers and Cancelling: The Quiet Disquiet. YoungFamilyLife.
Topics: #Narcissism #Misogyny #Misandry #TransactionalAnalysis #Positioning #ShameVsGuilt #StrokeEconomy #ProgressionPathway #ShadowProjection #SocialReinforcement
© 2026 Steve Young and YoungFamilyLife Ltd. All rights reserved.
This essay was developed collaboratively using AI assistance to research academic sources and refine content structure, while maintaining the author's original voice, insights, and "Information Without Instruction" philosophy. No part of this essay may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.
For permission requests, contact: info@youngfamilylife.com]